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CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND
THE SEC. By Nicholas Wolfson.1 Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books. 1990. Pp. vi, 178. Cloth, $42.95.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN
MILITARY: A COMMUNICATION MODELING ANAL·
YSIS. By Cathy Packer.2 New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers. 1989. Pp. xii, 268. Cloth, $47.95.
John M. Rogers 3

The Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea set out to prove that you
can't move from point A to point B. First you have to get to the
half-way point between A and B. Let's call that point Al. Then
you have to get to the half-way point between Al and B, which we
can call A2. Then you have to get to the half-way point between A2
and B, or A3. And so on. An infinite number of movements are
necessary before you ever arrive at B, and so you can never get to B.
The problem is that people get to B all the time. Some scholarly
discussions of free speech issues, including the books under review,
suffer from the equivalent of this weakness in Zeno's reasoning.
I

Nicholas Wolfson has set out to demonstrate that the federal
securities laws regulate speech that cannot be distinguished from
speech fully protected by the first amendment. The problem is that
most of us would agree that some speech is not entitled to "full"
first amendment protection. How do we get there without either
using distinctions that Wolfson says won't work, or identifying
some other distinction that he has neglected? Thus, Wolfson's argument has a Zeno-like flavor. In this sense his argument is unsatisfying, although otherwise challenging, perceptive, and carefully
analytical.
Under the federal securities statutes, the SEC regulates what
corporations may say when they solicit proxies, what hostile bidders
must disclose during takeovers, and what securities issuers must put
in prospectuses. The SEC also licenses the giving of investment advice. There is no defensible way to distinguish these regulations of
2.
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speech, according to Wolfson, from regulation of the content of
newspapers or political speeches.
In his first chapter, Wolfson examines the case law dealing
with commercial speech in general. Many of the Supreme Court
cases deal with advertising, which in recent decades has been given
a modicum of first amendment protection as "commercial speech,"
though less than that accorded "noncommercial speech." Chapter
two involves "SEC speech" in particular. Three Supreme Court
justices relied upon the first amendment to support a decision that
the SEC could not stop unregistered investment advisers from publication of advice in securities newsletters. Two circuits have examined whether the SEC can regulate corporate press releases or
newspaper advertisements intended to influence proxy contests or
stock purchases.
In the next two chapters, Wolfson evaluates the positions of
various scholars regarding the lesser first amendment protection
given to commercial speech. These include Martin Redish, C. Edwin Baker, Thomas Jackson and John Jeffries, Frederick Schauer,
Vincent Blasi, Steven Shiffrin, Laurence Tribe, Aaron Director,
Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, Fred S. McChesney, and George J.
Bentson. The final chapter, previously published in part as a law
review article, sets forth affirmatively Wolfson's position that "[t]he
federal securities laws regulate speech that is impossible to meaningfully distinguish from speech that all of us would concede should
receive the full protection of the First Amendment."
Wolfson first identifies the most generally accepted underlying
purposes of the first amendment. One is to aid the political process.
Certainly our political system assumes that ideas can be freely exchanged. Another purpose is to facilitate the search for truth. The
idea is that truth may best be arrived at by the free competition of
ideas. Finally, the first amendment may also be supported by the
intrinsic value to individual human beings to express themselves
and to hear others. Each of these purposes, according to Wolfson,
supports freedom to advertise a product for sale as much as it supports freedom to express oneself in other ways.
The first amendment freedom of expression furthers the democratic process, but unless we accept Robert Bork's now-discredited
article in the Indiana Law Journal, the first amendment cannot be
limited to campaign speech. In any event, a lot of campaign speech
is economically self-interested and therefore indistinguishable from
advertising.
The search for truth may also be furthered as much by business
advertising as by political or artistic expression, according to Wolf-
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son. He rejects the often-cited rationale that business advertising is
hardier and more resistant to suppression than political or artistic
speech. Among his arguments are that political speech often reflects economic interests and is therefore robust. Moreover, "[i]t is
commonplace to contrast the courage of the ideologue to the timidity of the businessman." Wolfson also rather easily disposes of the
argument that the content of advertisements is more easily verifiable
than the content of political speech. Some advertisements are obviously difficult to verify (e.g., "our shampoo will beautify your
hair"), while some political speech can be verified or disproved easily (e.g., "The Holocaust did not occur.").
Finally, business advertising involves personal fulfillment, and
often contains artistic and cultural expression, while some speech
that is fully protected by the first amendment, such as a book praising one's product, may be just as economically self-interested as any
advertisement.
All of this presents a cogent argument for protecting advertising expression as fully as political or artistic expression. 4 Still, full
first amendment protection for business advertising is not the same
thing as full first amendment protection for all of the expression
that the SEC regulates. A proxy solicitation is not an advertisement. In this regard, Wolfson reasons as follows: The primary justification for not applying the full protection of the first amendment
to SEC speech is that it is commercial speech. The distinction
doesn't even work for business advertising. Since business advertising presumably deserves full protection, SEC speech certainly does
so-it is closer to political and artistic speech than is advertising,
and therefore more deserving of protection.
The problem with this analysis is that we know that some
kinds of conduct having expressive content may be regulated. Driving fast on the highway may, for instance, be expressive. If we start
with an activity that is clearly not subject to full first amendment
scrutiny, and extend this to find an expanding number of other
types of conduct to be indistinguishable, we may ultimately reach
SEC speech, and from SEC speech onwards to unprotected activi4. One response might be that the harms resulting from failure to regulate advertising
are different in nature from the harms resulting from nonregulation of political or artistic
expression. Such an argument does not necessarily undermine the persuasiveness of Wolfson's argument, however. The dangers of political and social upheaval resulting from limits
on the ability of government to control political and artistic expression are perhaps no less
than the dangers of consumer fraud. In addition, the danger of social upheaval may indeed
be lessened in the long run by a wide freedom of expression. But the danger of consumer
fraud might similarly be actually lessened by limiting government control of advertising.
Consumers would have the advantage of vigorous counteradvertising, and they might also
generally rely less on the accuracy of fully unregulated advertising.
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ties. If such a progression is tenable, then the Constitution, in order
to avoid a contradiction, can only be interpreted to require that a
rough line be drawn. It is therefore not enough to say merely that
SEC speech is indistinguishable from some speech that is fully protected. Wolfson must also distinguish SEC speech from conduct
that is clearly not. Such a distinction may not be easy.
Surely, for instance, the government can regulate how a corporation is formed or governed. When people organize themselves
into corporations, they do so to take advantage of benefits (such as
limited liability) that are granted by the law. It is hard to imagine
that the Constitution prohibits conditions from being imposed upon
the structure of organizations that obtain such benefits. But much
of the activity of putting together or governing any organization is
communicative. The idea that corporate structure can be regulated
thus suggests that expression can be regulated. Clear examples
would be notice requirements for shareholder meetings, and voting
requirements for shareholders. It is only a small step to say that the
state can regulate what must be in a prospectus, or what must be in
proxy solicitations. If the state can do this, moreover, without violating the first amendment, surely the federal government can do so
as well.
Wolfson rejects the argument that modem corporate structure
is by its nature particularly coercive or dangerous, but rejecting
such an argument is a far cry from saying corporate structure cannot be regulated. Wolfson suggests a couple of times that he is really talking about freedom of association rather than freedom of
expression. The implication is that the first amendment limits the
regulation of corporate structure. He even says that the only difference between a corporation and a political party is the indefensible
one that the corporation is commercial. But a political party needs
no statutory authority to form; a corporation does.s
Most recently, the Supreme Court has cut back even on the
first amendment rights of corporations with respect to political
campaign contributions. The rationale for upholding a Michigan
statute limiting campaign contributions by a nonprofit corporation
was that:
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets-that enhance their ability
5. Certainly the Supreme Court has not indicated that our Constitution guarantees the
benefits of corporate status to people who organize themselves any which way, though the
first amendment has recently and logically been held to protect the ability of political parties
to decide how to organize.
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to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments.
. . . Michigan's regulation aims at . . . the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas. 6

While this rationale is subject to criticism (three justices dissented vigorously) where political campaigns are concerned, the argument certainly has great force where corporate governance is
involved. Austin thus fundamentally undermines Wolfson's argument. He seems to realize this, but doesn't really have an answer,
beyond the points made in dissent in that case.
Justice Scalia's dissent, for instance, argued that noncorporate
groups and individuals are given state advantages ranging from tax
breaks to cash subsidies, but that a state cannot condition such favors on loss of the first amendment protection. At some point,
though, such an argument breaks down. The government, for instance, can certainly pay a publicity company to advertise in favor
of Armed Forces recruitment, and condition such payment on
speaking in favor of, rather than against, enlisting in the Army.
The reason must be that there is a close relationship between the
government benefit and the limitation on expression. 1 There is
room for argument about the directness of the relationship between
the benefits of corporate status and limits on campaign contributions, but much less room to question the relationship between the
benefits of corporate status and the rules of corporate governance. s
Austin v. Michigan ChamberofCommerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1397 (1990).
Stated differently, the government can sometimes "buy" the waiver of a constitutional right. While this sounds harsh in the abstract, it happens all the time when the waiver
and the "purchase" are very closely connected. See, most recently, Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S.
Ct. 1759, 1771-76 (1991). If an American has the right to go where he or she pleases, and not
be confined for a long period of time without due process of law, the government can certainly hire the same American to sit, for instance, in a guardhouse or at a desk for eight hours
a day, fifty weeks per year. As long as the paycheck keeps getting cashed, the government
can demand such "confinement," if that "confinement" is an integral part of what is being
paid for. We can argue about whether this is the wisest use of the employee, but it doesn't
help the argument too much to talk about not depriving the person of liberty without due
process of law. Of course if the employee is not desk bound as part of the job, but rather as a
punishment for dishonesty, due process considerations come back into play. But the first
question is whether the very terms of employment involve the "confinement."
8. Take a statutory requirement that shareholders receive notice of shareholder meetings, for example. Corporate status facilitates coherent pooling of resources, and the resulting social good arguably outweighs society's interest in insuring that individuals have more
direct control over how their resources are used. The requirement of notice for shareholder
meetings puts a minor limit on the ability of economic interests to act coherently. The limit is
6.
7.
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Once the constitutionality of government regulation of corporate governance is established, it must still be asked whether the
kinds of regulation that the SEC engages in are similarly justified as
a condition for governmental benefits. The SEC regulates not only
corporations, but also other types of entities that issue securities,
though most are statutory creations of one sort or another. Perhaps
SEC regulation is not sufficiently related to the benefits that the
government gives to the largely-corporate participants in the investment market. The issue is of course distinct from the issue of
whether such rules are wise.
The key inquiry is whether the control of speech inherent in
SEC regulation can be seen as part of the bargain in permitting individuals to organize themselves to attract investment in certain profitable ways. The answer may be yes or no, but it does not dispose of
the question just to demonstrate that the speech is indistinguishable
from fully protected speech in terms of its nature, purpose, or effect.
In short, if any part of corporation law is free of first amendment
inquiry, then Wolfson has not distinguished it from the "SEC
speech" that he says should be protected by the first amendment.
II

Cathy Packer's argument on free speech and the military is
similar to Wolfson's in many ways. She attacks the present Court's
standards for reviewing restrictions on military speech, taking aim
at the grounds most often asserted for distinguishing military
speech from civilian speech for first amendment purposes. Her ultimate claim, however, is considerably less radical than Wolfson's. It
is not that there should be no distinction, but that under the first
amendment there should be "greater tolerance of servicemembers'
expressive activities" than there is now. She doesn't take a position
on how much greater that tolerance should be.
Packer starts with a summary history of the development of
theories of communication. Various models of how communication
works have been developed since World War I, reflecting the increased recognition of such factors as listener selectivity, feedback,
psychological framework of the sender and receiver, "noise,"
agenda-setting, and so on. After reviewing two dozen models, each
accompanied by a computer-graphic illustration, Packer sets forth
her own summary model, emphasizing that communication is "a
continuous process that works differently in different contexts and
directly related to the benefit that those interests enjoy because the limit serves to protect the
very interest compromised by the statute-the social good that results from individuals" having more direct control over the use of their resources.
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when communicators have different communications skills," and
also that "communication has an unpredictable variety of purposes
and effects, or it may have no effect at all."
Packer then surveys the literature on communication in the
military, including S.L.A. Marshall's comments on the lack of clear
commanding voices on the battlefield during World War II, varying
views on how well enlisted persons' thinking is heard in the officer
ranks, arguments that the development of sophisticated new weapons requires greater discussion and individual responsibility among
servicemembers, and published discussions of the effect of dissent in
the ranks during the Vietnam War.
She next surveys law journal articles and other scholarly opinion on such issues as whether the Bill of Rights should be applied to
the military, how the first amendment should apply to soldiers, and
whether particular articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
are unconstitutional. Her fourth survey covers the military justice
system in general, including a section on civilian court jurisdiction
over military cases. She relies for the most part upon sometimes
dated secondary authority; this is the apparent cause of her omitting to mention the 1983 statutory provision for Supreme Court review of Court of Military Appeals decisions. 9
Next is a survey of cases: military court cases from 1951 to
1964 affirming convictions for expressive activity, later Supreme
Court cases involving protest against the Vietnam War, and various
federal cases involving limits on servicemember speech. The two
key Supreme Court cases were Parker v. Levy,w upholding the
court martial conviction of an Army doctor for counselling black
soldiers not to go to Vietnam, and Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech,tt
upholding the court martial of a private in Vietnam who gave a
typed statement critical of the war to a military mimeograph operator to have copies made.
Packer's final survey is of varying views about four post-Vietnam first amendment problems involving the military: are unions
compatible with the military? may soldiers participate in extremist
group activity? can the political speech of generals be silenced? to
what extent can commanders keep their soldiers from circulating
petitions?
With all the "literature" laid out, Packer applies it in her final
chapter to ascertain the "model" accepted by courts as descriptive
9.

28

Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393, 1405 (1983) codified at
§ 1259 (1988).
417 U.S. 733 (1974).
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of military communication. The model's flaws of course demonstrate that the courts' conclusions are defective. She contrasts the
model with the overall communication model described in her first
survey. A more accurate military communication model would
lead presumably to wiser court judgments, though Packer barely
suggests what those judgments should be. She merely sets forth a
more descriptive model. This is the employment of social science
jargon to engage in legal criticism.
She first lists the characteristics of the "separate military society" (the phrase is from Parker v. Levy) assumed in the case law:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

the military has the unique mission of waging war
successfully,
because of the threat of war, the military does not have time
to allow the marketplace of ideas to work,
instant and unquestioning obedience is both possible and
necessary to the military mission,
soldiers are motivated to risk their lives because they are
trained to obey orders and are instilled with loyalty to their
country and commanders, and
there is effective two-way communication through official
military channels.

Packer criticizes each of these "characteristics" seriatim, though
not always persuasively.12
Packer next lists four legal rationales for abridging the first
amendment rights of military personnel:
(1)

the military must remain politically neutral,

12. Sometimes the characterization of the military is relatively accurate, but the criticism is weak. For instance, it is true that courts refer to the military's unique mission of
waging war successfully; Packer's only vaguely critical comment is that large percentages of
our forces perform service and support functions where the attitude of the enlisted person
toward war is "of marginal importance."
Other times the characteristic is in the nature of a straw man. For instance, the third
characteristic suggests that the discipline furthered by limits on expression involves "absolute
obedience" and "shouting orders to be instantly obeyed." Packer cites various authorities for
the propositions that new weapons systems make individual initiative more important, that
reliance by modem armies upon small units requires training that emphasizes tactical flexibility and initiative, and that absolute obedience on the part of all members of the armed forces
is impossible. The implication is that "[s]trict discipline during training may fail to instill in
soldiers the initiative and decision-making skills needed in small combat units." This is simply playing with the meaning of the word "discipline." It is a caricature of the concept to
describe discipline only as unthinking compliance with detailed orders. If the ordered mission requires initiative and independent decision-making, then ready compliance with orders
to undertake such a mission-reflecting the highest discipline--demands such initiative and
independence. It is therefore nonsense to juxtapose discipline and initiative as opposites. It is
probably even more important to have discipline, properly understood, when small units are
required to react to new situations without detailed instructions from higher up.
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(2) loyalty and morale must be maintained at a high level in
order for soldiers to fight effectively,
(3) strict order, discipline, and obedience must be maintained if
a military force is to act promptly and efficiently, and
(4) the appearance to foreign countries of dissension in the
ranks of the U.S. armed forces should be avoided.

Now for the big jump. "Implicit in those rationales" are four
assumptions:
(1) communication is a discrete, linear process that can be
stopped,
(2) the purpose of communication usually is persuasive,
(3) communication has powerful, direct, and predictable effects, and
(4) the communication process works the same way regardless
of who is communicating and regardless of the context in
which the communication process occurs.

To read these assumptions into the arguments listed requires a lot of
stretching. For instance, a conviction of a former POW in North
Korea for expressing support for the North Koreans in speeches,
groups, and classes while a POW was upheld with a judicial comment that the speech could be used to help the enemy. This and
other cases show that the courts find such speech to be "powerfully
persuasive." Certainly speech can persuade, or at least potentially
persuade, without our assuming that the purpose of the speech was
persuasive, or that all of the effects are direct and predictable. Yet
when Packer subsequently criticizes the list of assumptions, the
context for arriving at them is lacking, and they can be criticized as
being simplistic. "[T]he purpose of communication is frequently
not persuasion and ... receivers as well as senders have multiple
motives." Communication has "a wide range of effects" that may
be "direct or indirect, short- or long-term, cumulative or noncumulative." It is hard to see how these insights undermine court decisions upholding punishment for speech in aid of the enemy, or for
speech encouraging disaffection or disobedience.
Even more than in the case of corporate regulation, it is clear
that the military can control the speech of servicemembers. "Tell
your subordinates to prepare to attack at dawn," or "establish liaison with foreign unit X" are obvious examples of control of the
expression of soldiers. It should be obvious that such control is necessary, and that failure to comply should be punishable by court
martial. It would be absurd to interpret the first amendment to the
contrary. As in the case of government control of corporate structure, the very government undertaking assumes some control over
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expression, control that would not be permitted if the expression
were that of a private citizen. Such control is a condition of
service.n
Again, this is not to suggest that the government can control
military speech completely. At some point the connection between
the military endeavor on the one hand and a soldier's expression on
the other becomes too attenuated. Where that point lies seems a
question best answered initially by the military, subject ultimately
to court review. Military leaders like to get the job done, and the
value of communication is forced upon those who don't already appreciate it. Military leaders also know a lot about the nature of
discipline; martinets shouting orders went out of style long ago.
Doubtless the interest in free expression by soldiers is not weighed
as accurately by the military as it is by the courts, but it is just as
likely that a court will not weigh the military's interest in discipline
as accurately as the military will. It therefore makes sense for the
courts generally to defer to the military in evaluating that interest.
Certainly an across-the-board increase in the amount of court intrusion into the military communication structure requires far more
justification than Packer has presented.

TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE. By H. Richard Uviller.1 Chicago:
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Appellate judges and legal academics too often lack firsthand
acquaintance with the front-line realities of the criminal justice system. Fearing that his own exposure to those realities as a young
prosecutor had grown stale during fourteen years teaching law, Professor H. Richard Uviller spent eight months of a recent sabbatical
"hanging out with" and observing police in the crime-ridden Ninth
Precinct of New York City. The book that resulted should interest
13. While service is not always voluntary, everyone recognizes that military service in·
valves at least the kinds of loss of freedom that are incident to voluntary employment. If a
drafted soldier has the freedom to flout orders, then it doesn't make much sense to have a
draft at all. Maybe the draft is unwise or unconstitutional, but surely such a conclusion is not
required simply by the freedom of expression principles of the first amendment.
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